Preparing for emerging and unknown threats in crops by Fletcher, Jacqueline
4
Preparing for Emerging and Unknown Threats 
in Crops
Jacqueline Fletcher
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater, Oklahoma
jacqueline.fletcher@okstate.edu
Diseases of plants have had significant impact on the course of human history. Almost 
every schoolchild learns of the devastating famine that occurred in Ireland in the mid-
800s, when unusually cold, damp conditions caused an oomycete pathogen, Phytophthora 
infestans, to wreak far more damage than usual on the potato crop on which millions 
of subsistence farmers and their families relied. The stories of a million starving Irish 
who perished as a result, and of the .5 million who emigrated—many to the United 
States—are familiar to us (Large, 40). But countless other stories of plant diseases have 
helped to shape social, political, military, and financial decisions and actions around the 
globe. Why do the British drink tea? It wasn’t always that way. At about the same time 
that the Irish potato famine was causing such misery in the British Isles, the rust fungus 
Hemileia vastatrix was devastating what was then the greatest coffee-growing region of 
the world, the island of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), then a British colony. Despite exten-
sive efforts to manage the disease, the coffee industry was unable to survive the severe 
economic losses, and British farmers on Ceylon began to transform their acreages into 
tea plantations. Soon, British consumers were drinking tea, and the habit stuck. On a 
more serious note, severe food shortages during the most critical period of World War 
I resulted after cool and humid conditions on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean favored 
pathogens of potatoes and wheat, forcing military leaders of both sides to alter their 
troops’ movements and strategies.
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Plant diseases still affect human health and society (Stack and Fletcher, 00). 
Although they are unlikely to cause significant food shortages or malnutrition in the 
United States and other developed nations (in the event that a particular crop—even a 
major staple—were to be eliminated by disease we, in the United States, would just eat 
something else), it is a different story in developing nations. Imagine, for example, the 
loss of the rice crop in southeast Asia, or of cassava in eastern and central Africa. Such 
events are not merely speculation; the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture in 
Nigeria reports that cassava brown streak virus has been spreading in central and eastern 
Africa, seriously threatening food security in already-unstable regions such as Rwanda 
and Tanzania (Ferguson et al., 00).
That a clear relationship exists between food security and the stability of social and 
political systems has been demonstrated repeatedly (Chakraborty and Newton, 0), 
and a number of recent and even current examples are available. Low-income economies 
are more sensitive to food inflation as the poor spend a higher percentage of their incomes 
on food. In the aftermath of the 00 earthquake in Haiti, slow distribution of aid and 
supplies to hard-hit areas and refuges established for newly homeless citizens led to squalid 
conditions of hunger and disease. Sporadic violence, rioting and looting resulted as food 
prices skyrocketed; the price of rice more than doubled in the post-quake period. Limited 
resources and desperation triggered by deplorable conditions pushed tempers and patience 
past the breaking point and vigilante groups took matters into their own hands. Soar-
ing food prices of staple commodities such as sugar, rice and milk have forced people in 
many Arab states to allocate larger portions of their income to the basic necessities of life, 
pushing them deeper into poverty and sparking a revolutionary wave of demonstrations 
and protests known as Arab Spring (Javid, 0). A similar food-price crisis in 008 led 
to protests and riots in more than thirty countries.
Crop Vulnerability to Disease
The United States’ agricultural enterprise includes myriad crop species grown in many 
systems from extensive field acreages (corn, wheat, barley, etc.) to small plots of exotic, 
organic and specialty crops (artichokes, microgreens, jicama, herbs, etc.). Every plant 
species is vulnerable to a variety of diseases caused by microbial agents, including fungi, 
bacteria, viruses and viroids, nematodes, protozoa, and even parasitic plants. Increasing 
the complexity of the plant-pathogen relationships, many plant pathogens are transmit-
ted by plant-feeding insects such as leafhoppers and sharpshooters, aphids, whiteflies, 
and beetles.
The vulnerability of US agriculture to emerging pathogens and pests derives from 
a number of factors (NRC, 00a; Whitby, 00; Gullino et al. 008; Fletcher et al., 
00). First is the monetary value of these crops, considering that they generate a sixth 
of our gross domestic product and represent between 5% and 0% of our employment. 
Features of our agricultural practices also contribute to vulnerability. Most of our crops are 
planted as monocultures, the genetic identity of which ensures that a pathogen sickening 
one plant has the potential to sicken them all. Vast acreages planted to field crops go un-
monitored for extended periods, usually from planting until harvest. Naturally occurring 
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plant resources, such as forests and rangelands, are similarly un-watched. These factors can 
result in very long lag periods between the introduction of a pathogen and its detection 
and identification, and the initiation of a response. Vulnerability results also from the 
ease and frequency with which exotic new pathogens traverse our borders, whether on 
the winds of hurricanes, in the bilge water of ships, on the shoes of tourists who visited 
farms outside the United States, on the imported fresh fruits and vegetables that we now 
expect as year-round supplements to our menus, or by a thousand other pathways that 
occur daily, naturally, and predictably.
Additional vulnerability comes from the cost of plant diseases and crop losses (NRC, 
00a; Whitby, 00; Madden, 003; Gullino et al., 008; Fletcher et al., 00). These 
include reductions in yield and quality of the commodities (blemished fruit, toxins in 
grain), as well as the costs of growing less-desirable crops. These factors often lead to 
higher food prices and to shortages of certain types of foods. Costs of disease prevention 
and management also add up, including the cost of short-term control strategies such 
as pesticide application, biocontrol adoption, or crop replacement, as well as long-term 
strategies such as the incorporation of disease-resistance genes into high-value crops. 
Even more critical, however, are the national and international trade disruptions brought 
about by quarantines and embargoes against the presence of specific pathogens or toxins 
in particular crops or commodities. Subsequent downstream impacts are often felt in 
rural communities where the economy is often tied to the success of their agricultural 
ventures.
Challenges for Assuring Food Stability Nationally and Globally
Vulnerabilities from New Crops and Pathogens
New crops and new pathogens bring new vulnerabilities. The USDA Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) maintains, and regularly updates, a list of plant 
pathogens of unusually threatening nature, called select agents (USDA APHIS, undated). 
This list helps in the prioritization of resource allocations and defines the boundaries of 
the stringent regulatory policy deemed essential for US crop security. All of the plant 
pathogen select infectious agents are exotic to the United States.  Since the creation of 
the list, two plant pathogen select agents have arrived and become established within US 
borders (Phakopsora pachyrhizi, causal agent of soybean rust, in 004 and Liberibacter 
asiaticus, causal agent of citrus greening, in 006). Once clearly established, the causal 
pathogens were removed from the select agent list to facilitate research to manage these 
diseases. However, plant pathogens other than those on the select agent list also pose sig-
nificant threats to US agriculture. Most notably, a relatively new race of the wheat stem 
rust pathogen, Puccinia graminis f. sp. tritici race TTKS (“Ug”)—which emerged in 
Uganda in 8 and has since spread well beyond the area initially affected—is of sig-
nificant concern because of the lack of resistance in most of the wheat varieties currently 
grown in the world, including in the United States (Njau et al., 00). The FAO (00) 
has described the potential impact on the human condition in certain wheat-dependent 
regions as “disastrous.” A high priority for US wheat breeders is to identify and incorporate 
resistance to this fungal race into key US wheat varieties. 
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Climate Change
The predicted transitions of global climate zones will affect the optimal distributions and 
possible ranges of plants, insects and pathogens (Coakley et al., ; Eastburn et al., 
0; Garrett et al., 0; Shaw and Osborne, 0) It is likely that members of all of 
these groups will become prevalent in areas not now occupied, and will cease to thrive 
in others. In some cases, the outlines of new geographical ranges for a plant species may 
not precisely coincide with those of certain pathogens or insect vectors, creating the pos-
sibility for new host-pathogen-vector associations. The range changes constitute a new 
vulnerability for food security as well as for emerging pathogens and pests.
Nefarious Use of Plant Pathogens
Plant pathogens offer attractive features to those with harmful intent, whether their mo-
tives are terrorism, economic gain, revenge, or social/political expression (NRC, 00a; 
Fletcher and Stack, 00; Fletcher et al., 00). They are easily available at little or no 
cost and offer little or no threat to the health of the handlers. Although a plant disease 
may not be perceived as catastrophic, its impacts on food insecurity and social instability 
may be quite serious, as noted above. Plant pathogens were included as components of 
consideration in the biowarfare programs of a number of nations prior to the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention in 5, which commits the 63 state signers to prohibit the 
development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents and toxins.
Human Pathogens on Plants
Foodborne illnesses are on the rise worldwide, and, although they once were considered 
to be associated primarily with meat contamination, an ever-increasing percentage of 
outbreaks is associated with fresh produce such as tomatoes, spinach and sprouts (Brandl, 
006; Teplitski et al., 00). Although most disease outbreaks result from accidental con-
tamination, some have been linked to cases of criminal negligence (in which distributors 
failed to maintain sanitary conditions, or knowingly released contaminated products). 
However, remarkably, to our knowledge, only one significant case of intentional con-
tamination, resulting in hundreds of illnesses, has emerged. This incident was the 84 
deliberate contamination by a religious cult of restaurant salad bars in Oregon, as part of 
a plan to sway a local election. However, the recent outbreak of a particularly aggressive 
and virulent strain of Escherichia coli in Germany, in which forty-six died and nearly 
4,000 were taken ill (Kupferschmidt, 0), demonstrates our lack of preparedness to 
prevent, quickly detect and diagnose, and minimize damage from such events—whether 
naturally occurring or intentionally caused.
Elements of a Strong National Security Plan
A report produced by the National Research Council (00b) suggested that a strong 
national biosecurity plan should consist of:
• early detection and diagnostic systems;
• epidemiological models for predicting pathogen spread;
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• reasonable but effective strategies and policies for crop biosecurity;
• distributed physical and administrative infrastructure;
• a national response-coordination plan and infrastructure, and
• strategies for forensic investigation and attribution in cases of intentional or 
criminal activity.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive , issued by President Bush in 004, mandated 
a National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS). The task was assigned to the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, then Anne Veneman, who made it the responsibility of the USDA 
Office of Pest Management Policy. The initiative consists of the preparation of response 
plans for each of the APHIS plant pathogen select agents as well as a number of other 
threatening plant pathogens; completed plans can be viewed at http://www.ars.usda.
gov/Research/docs.htm?docid=4. The NPDRS’s purpose is to ensure that the tools, 
infrastructure, communication networks, and capacity required to mitigate the impacts 
of high-consequence plant-disease outbreaks are such that a reasonable level of crop 
production is maintained in the United States. The recovery plans represent a coopera-
tive effort of university, industry, and government scientists managed by the American 
Phytopathological Society (APS) in partnership with the USDA.
A second initiative emerging after the 00 attacks was the establishment of the National 
Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) (Stack et al., 006). This nationwide system of plant 
diagnostic laboratories—an initiative led by the USDA’s CSREES1 (now NIFA2)—was a 
achieved through strong cooperation among USDA agencies, land-grant universities, state 
Departments of Agriculture (SDAs), and private laboratories. Prior to this time, plant 
diagnostic laboratories, of which there was generally one per state, were in some cases as-
sociated with a land-grant university and in other cases part of the SDAs. They often were 
under-funded and their diagnosticians operated in isolation and without coordination. 
The NPDN structure and funding brought, for the first time, all of the laboratories into 
a single framework. Organized into five regional units, but coordinated as a whole, the 
network assured a minimum level of capability through training and equipment resources. 
By adopting common assay protocols, positive and negative controls, and reagents, data 
and records could be shared and compared among the labs. Expertise from each lab was 
available to the other state laboratories. Plant disease diagnosticians, now recognized for 
their important contributions to the US agricultural enterprise, took new pride in their 
accomplishments. The NPDN is a true success story in which preparation for potential 
threats against our agricultural systems generated substantial benefit for managing ev-
eryday agricultural problems. As this paper is being written, the future of the NPDN 
is threatened by severe federal budget cuts. Its loss due to lack of funding would erase a 
decade of progress, value and capability, and turn the business of plant-disease diagnosis 
back to an inefficient and minimally supported enterprise lacking optimal capability to 
anticipate, detect, respond to and mitigate the effects of the ever-increasing emerging 
pathogens and pests that continue to threaten our crops.
1Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service.
2National Institute for Food and Agriculture.
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In addition to the NPDRS and the NPDN, many other initiatives that emerged fol-
lowing September , 00, addressed agricultural vulnerability and preparedness. The 
USDA established an Office of Homeland Security within the office of the secretary, 
APHIS developed new response and regulatory policies (including the select agent list), 
the USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) initiated research programs related to 
pathogens of concern, and CSREES developed and supported new initiatives in education, 
outreach and research (now under the auspices of NIFA). The newly formed Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) established the National Biodefense Analysis and Coun-
termeasures Center (NBACC3), within which the National Bioforensic Analysis Center 
(NBFAC) was charged with developing and providing forensic capabilities for attribution 
and prosecution of those involved in criminal actions related to homeland security (both 
NBACC and NBFAC are now managed by a non-governmental organization).
The Need for New Capability in Microbial Forensics
A study commissioned by the US defense community in 00, following the mailing of 
letters containing anthrax spores to a number of targets, called for the development of 
greater capability in microbial forensics (Budowle et al., 005a, 005b). Although most 
of the effort that followed was focused, logically, on solving the anthrax case, the report 
included specific language indicating the need for plant-pathogen forensics. A panel of 
plant pathologists was charged to review existing capabilities that could be brought to bear 
in the investigation of a criminal case involving plant pathogens, as well as to identify needs 
and gaps and recommend priorities for near-term funding, research and applications. In 
their report (Fletcher et al., 006), the authors noted a difference between plant-disease 
diagnostic activities carried out following “normal” disease outbreaks, when the goal is to 
identify the pathogen to species or strain as needed to formulate effective management 
strategies, and those needed for a crime-scene investigation, which must be conducted 
at a high level of stringency with validated tests having high confidence levels so as to 
stand up to aggressive counter-arguments in court. Furthermore, challenges particular to 
the development and application of microbial forensic science to plant pathology were 
explored. For example, forensic scientists dealing with human victims need concern 
themselves with only one host species and the pathogens and toxins to which that host 
is susceptible, whereas plant pathologists deal with hundreds of host-plant species, each 
having a different set of pathogens. Because so many plant species are important to us, 
the basic biology of both host and pathogen is well understood for only a fraction of 
them. For many lesser-known plant pathogens, diagnostic technologies often are still 
rudimentary, and, even when molecular approaches are developed for them, the databases 
(public genome libraries, databases of substrate utilization and fatty acid profiles) lack 
information for these plant pathogens and their relatives. And, despite a growing recog-
nition on the part of federal policymakers of the importance of our nation’s agricultural 
enterprise, funding for work on plants remains comparatively very low and even some 
post-0 funds targeted to this area have since been eliminated. 
3http://www.bnbi.org/.
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The National Institute for Microbial Forensics & Food and 
Agricultural Biosecurity
While the work of the NPDN, the NPDRS, APHIS, and ARS and others is relevant to 
plant-pathogen forensics, the mission and focus of each of these entities are directed to 
different goals. At Oklahoma State University the concept of a new program to focus 
specifically on plant-pathogen forensics and its role in agricultural biosecurity grew as 
the needs and gaps in this emerging discipline were clarified in the assessment study. 
OSU administrative leaders at all levels were supportive and provided encouragement 
and preliminary resources for the program’s initiation. In 00, the National Institute 
for Microbial Forensics & Food and Agricultural Biosecurity was established as a cross-
disciplinary and cross-departmental unit at OSU. Its goal is to identify, assess, prioritize, 
facilitate and conduct research, education and outreach (the three activities fundamental 
to any land-grant university) related to national needs in microbial forensic science with 
respect to pathogens of crops, forests, rangelands and other plant resources, with an 
additional component related to human pathogens on fresh produce. Its mission state-
ment is:
NIMFFAB will build on, connect and enhance existing programs that support 
and address issues of crop and food security.
The Institute’s core staff of five faculty members, enhanced by a growing group of partners 
and collaborators, has strong expertise in plant pathology, forensic sciences, microbiology, 
vector-plant pathogen interactions, diagnostics and detection design and development, 
microbial population biology, molecular biology, metagenomics and next-generation 
sequencing, bioinformatics, produce safety, and human pathogens on plants.
The NIMFFAB uses targeted strategies and approaches to accomplish its mission. A key 
role is to serve as a link between the plant-pathology community and law enforcement 
and security communities, policymakers, and funding agencies. Critical to its effective-
ness is maintaining strong and open ties with end-users and other stakeholders within 
the Department of Homeland Security’s affiliated National Bioforensic Analysis Center 
(of which NIMFFAB is a Spoke Laboratory), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
the USDA’s Office of Homeland Security, APHIS, ARS, NIFA, NPDRS, and NPDN, 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
other government agencies, industry, and scientific societies.
Education
NIMFFAB directs and mentors graduate students in novel MS and PhD programs that 
blend multidisciplinary programs in new ways. For example, funding from an innovative 
USDA program designed to address emerging national needs has allowed NIMFFAB 
graduate students to be the first in the United States to take coursework and perform 
research that incorporates both plant pathology and forensic sciences. An invaluable op-
portunity afforded our graduate students is the summer internship that they complete at a 
homeland security-related federal agency or industry. For example, two PhD students spent 
3 months doing research at the FBI laboratory in Quantico, VA. Because young scientists 
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rarely have a realistic understanding of careers in law enforcement or homeland security, 
these internships provide a unique opportunity to experience these environments.
Research
Almost all plant-pathology research is relevant in some way to agricultural applications 
of microbial forensics and homeland security. However, NIMFFAB faculty and their 
postdocs and students focus their research on initiatives targeted to support the forensic 
investigator’s capabilities in evaluating a criminal case involving plant pathogens or hu-
man pathogens on fresh produce. Most projects involve collaboration and partnerships 
with the agencies concerned. Examples of research areas include adaptation of current 
or novel plant-disease diagnostic methods for forensic investigation, adapting existing 
human forensic technologies to plant pathogens, and developing new investigative tools 
that facilitate the work of forensic investigators at the scene of a crop-focused crime. Plant 
pathologists have a unique advantage as developers of field-targeted tools and technolo-
gies, in that model systems involving locally common plant pathogens can be readily 
field-tested. Furthermore, data from naturally occurring plant-disease outbreaks can be 
compared directly to those from outbreaks of the same disease generated in field plots 
(following all regulatory requirements) by the investigators.
Outreach
Outstanding training courses and exercises related to crops and plant pathogens are of-
fered frequently by the NPDN and APHIS. Such activities are generally targeted toward 
NPDN plant-disease diagnosticians, APHIS personnel, and local and regional responder 
communities. The training niche that NIMFFAB addresses is designed specifically to 
bring federal forensic and security investigators into the picture, to provide information 
and practice for law enforcement in agricultural crime-scene settings, and to create op-
portunities for security and law-enforcement personnel to interact with the agricultural 
community, including Cooperative Extension educators, crop advisors and farmers. 
Furthermore, NIMFFAB facilitates interaction between the plant-pathology and law-en-
forcement/security agencies by organizing members of the APS—the primary professional 
association for plant pathologists—interested in these disciplines into interactive groups. 
The APS Microbial Forensics Interest Group and the APS Food Safety Interest Group 
meet yearly during the APS annual meeting, as a forum for prioritizing needs, providing 
community input, and developing collaborative initiatives in forensic plant pathology 
and fresh-produce safety.
Final Thoughts
US preparedness for maintaining the most secure and abundant food supply in the world 
has been improving, but gaps remain. Justifiable concerns about new and emerging 
pathogens and pests that threaten agricultural resources demonstrate the need for greater 
exploration of new and more effective ways of addressing these issues. Greater blending 
of disciplines will facilitate the creation of new knowledge, support the development of 
new technologies and capabilities, and allow the broad, cross-disciplinary training that 
young scientists will need to address these global challenges.
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